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I Appeal No. 20509 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue crucial to this appeal is whether sufficient 
evidence is before the trial judge to raise a material issue of 
fact, thus making Summary Judgment improper. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, Myrna I. Martin, brought this medical 
malpractice action against the defendants for negligence in 
failing to diagnose and treat in a proper and timely manner 
plaintiff's peripheral vascular disease. 
Defendant, Richard Mott, moved for Summary Judgment. 
The matter was heard before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier on 
November 30, 1984. On January 9, 1985 the court entered a Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendant Mott and against plaintiff, finding 
that plaintiff had not established by expert testimony that 
defendant was negligent. No other grounds for granting the 
summary judgement are mentioned by the record of the lower court. 
Plaintiff now Appeals from the judgement of the district court. 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's decision 
granting defendant a Summary Judgment. The relief sought is based 
on facts which show that plaintiff did have evidence sufficient to 
establish Mott's negligence and that the Order of the lower court 
was improper. 
Plaintiff was a patient of Dr. Mott, a podiatrist, from 
May 12, 1980 to June 3, 1980. The care involved numerous office 
visits and examinations of plaintiff conducted by Dr. Mott (Mott 
Deposition Exhibit "1"). On or about June 3, 1980, plaintiff was 
seen by Dr. Gordon R. Kimball, an orthopedic surgeon, who 
immediately diagnosed peripheral vascular disease and who 
immediately thereafter operated on plaintiff in an attempt to 
correct her circulatory problem (Mott Deposition, Exhibit "2"; 
Martin Deposition, p. 33-35). 
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During the time Dr. Mott treated plaintiff, the 
plaintiff presented Dr. Mott with several easily recognizable 
symptoms of peripheral vascular disease (Mott Deposition, P. 31, 
line 21 to p.32, line 9; p.44, lines 10-21; p. 46 line 10 to p.47, 
line 2 [regarding the so-called "rest pain"]; p. 20, lines 5-13; 
Exhibit "1"; [regarding pain felt by plaintiff]; p.20, line 19 to 
p. 22, line 2 [regarding plaintiff's pallor and paresthesia], 
Exhibit 1, line 21; p. 33, line 5; p. 44, line 22 to page 45, line 
20 [regarding tingling and numbness felt by plaintiff]). During 
Dr. Mott's care of plaintiff, he never diagnosed the peripheral 
vascular disease that was diagnosed by Dr. Kimball on June 3, 1980 
(Mott deposition, exhibits 1 and 2). Dr. Mott had, prior to the 
time he was consulted by plaintiff, referred other patients to 
vascular surgeons for treatment of peripheral vascular disease 
that he had recognized (Mott Deposition p. 21, line 16 to p. 22, 
line 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff argues that there is plenty of evidence before 
the district court to raise an issue of fact as to the defendant's 
negligence. The plaintiff's expert witness was competent to 
testify of the defendant's negligence since both practice in 
similar fields of the healing arts. The plaintiff's witness also 
knew the standard of care applicable to the defendant since his 
practice as a physician includes the field of the defendant's 
practice of podiatry. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT TO RENDER GRANTING OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT INAPPROPRIATE. 
The issue crucial to this appeal is whether sufficient 
evidence is before the trial judge to raise a material issue of 
fact, thus making Summary Judgment improper. At the hearing Dr. 
W. Fleming, a medical doctor, by deposition had expressed his 
opinion that the defendant's failure to diagnose peripheral 
vascular disease was negligence. Defendant argues that since Dr. 
Fleming quite candidly admitted that he was not intimately 
acquainted with the standard of care of podiatrists, then the 
plaintiff has failed to provide competent expert testimony 
regarding the negligence of Dr. Mott. What the Defendant and the 
trial court have failed to recognize is that podiatrists and 
physicians practice in the same field of medicine as respects the 
human foot. Section 58-5-12, Utah Code Annotated (1977 
amendment), defines the practice of podiatry as follows: 
Any person shall be held to be practicing 
chiropody who examines, diagnoses or treats, 
medically, mechanically or surgically, the 
ailments of the human foot, or massages in 
connection there with. 
The statute goes on to say: 
. . . and nothing in this chapter shall 
prohibit . . . the practice of podiatry by 
physicians and surgeons . . . 
Thus a physician may practice podiatry without any 
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further licensing. As a qualified practicioner in the field, Dr. 
Fleming is by definition familier with the applicable standard of 
practice. Dr. Mott's testimony is significant in this context. 
At the time of his deposition, he asserted that "Basically, I'm a 
physician and surgeon on the foot and foot specialist. (Mott 
Deposition, p. 3, lines 17-18, emphasis added.) A few moments 
later, Dr. Mott was asked about the scope of his training as a 
podiatrist: 
Q: Does the training of a podiatrist include 
alerting him to the signs and symptoms that 
may include systemic disease of various types? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Exhibit itself in the lower extremities? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: And is peripheral vascular disease among 
those? 
A: Yes. 
Q: As well as various other types of ailments 
and circulatory disorders? 
A: Yes. (Mott deposition, p. 8, lines 
12-22). 
Dr. Mott himself concedes that he is basically a 
physician and surgeon of the foot. It logically follows that he 
considers himself bound to comply with the standards applicable to 
a physician and surgeon as respects the foot. Since he 
specializes in the ailments of the foot, he should be able to 
recognize the signs and symptoms of diseases which manifest 
themselves in the foot, particularly crippling and painful 
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conditions such as peripheral vascular disease. Since Dr. Fleming 
is also a physician and surgeon whose practice includes those same 
ailments of the foot which the podiatrist addresses, he is by 
definition familiar with the standards applicable to such 
practice. This is true even though the physician and surgeon may 
not consider himself a "podiatrist." Dr. Fleming has testified 
that Dr. Mott's performance was deficient from the standpoint of a 
physician and surgeon. The condition involved the foot, and Dr. 
Mott considers himself to be a physician and surgeon as respects 
the foot. Dr. Fleming's opinion is based not only on defendant's 
failure to recognize the disease but also upon his innappropriate 
treatment. 
II. A PHYSICIAN IS QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE HEALING ARTS. 
In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67P.2d 654, 92 Utah 312, 
(1937), the Supreme Court held that a practitioner licensed to 
practice medicine in all its branches is qualified to testify as 
an expert witness in all fields of medicine. In this case, the 
defendant chiropractor appealed from a judgment entered by the 
trial court against him, citing as error, inter alia, that 
plaintiff's expert witnesses, who were physicians, should not have 
been allowed to testify since they "admitted that they had not 
studied 'chiropractic' and either had no knowledge or only a 
superficial knowledge thereof." 67 P.2d 654 at 666. The Court 
noted: 
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Under the Utah statute, a practitioner 
licensed to practice medicine is, if the trial 
court finds from the evidence that he is such 
practitioner, possessing the qualifications 
required of a practitioner of medicine in all 
its branches, qualified to testify as an 
expert in a malpractice case charging 
negligence in diagnosing or negligent 
treatment of human ailments. 
67 P.2d 654, at 664 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has therefore held as a matter of 
law that a physician is competent in Utah to testify concerning a 
chiropractor's negligence. This position applies equally to 
another limited field of the healing arts, that of podiatry. Many 
other jurisdictions also recognize physicians as experts for other 
branches of the healing arts. Where principles, techniques, 
methods, practices or procedures of one branch concur or are 
generally the same as those of another branch, the testimony of 
one branch is admissable. Creasey v. Hogan, 637 P.2d 114, (Oregon 
1981). Sutton v. Cook, 458 P.2d 402, (Oregon 1969). Even if the 
standard of care between the two healing arts do not totally 
agree, a witness can still testify on those points which do or 
should concur to show the applicable standard of care. Fridena 
v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, (Arizona 1980). Gaston v. Hunter, 588 
P.2d 326, (Arizona 1978). Dr. Fleming is a competent expert 
witness as to the standard of care used by Dr. Mott in the 
diagnosis and treatment of a disease which affects the foot. 
Dr. Mott himself admitted that he should have diagnosed 
plaintiff's peripheral vascular disease, but inexplicably failed 
to do so. That admission is competent evidence that defendant was 
negligent and should certainly justify submission to the trier of 
-7-
fact. See Martin deposition, P. 87, line 22 to p. 88, line 5. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's expert testimony is sufficient to establish 
a material issue of fact with regard to Dr. Mottfs negligence and 
plaintiff's resultant injury. 
The issue for determination on this appeal is whether a 
medical doctor called to testify on plaintiff's behalf is 
competent to offer his opinion regarding a defendant podiatrist's 
standard of care. This court resolved that question in the 
Walkenhorst case nearly fifty years ago, affirmatively. 
Appellant submits that Summary Judgment of dismissal 
entered by the lower court was error under Utah law and that the 
same should be reversed and the case be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this ?r day of June, 1985. 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached is a copy of the trial court's order of 
summary judgment dated January 9, 1985 from which order this 
appeal is taken. 
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS - A3481 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Mott 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNA I. MARTIN, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 
RICHARD C. MOTT, STEVEN D. 
TAYLOR, JAMES WILFERT, 
DAVID BURTON, INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba THE COTTON-
WOOD HOSPITAL, and JOHN DOES 
I through X, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Mottfs Motion for Summary Judgment having come 
on regularly for hearing on November 30, 1984, and all parties 
having been represented at said hearing by counsel, and the 
Court having heard arguments from counsel and having reviewed 
memoranda filed by plaintiff and defendant Mott, and the Court 
having concluded that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and being fully advised and having issued its Memorandum 
Civil No. C-81-8421 
Judge Philip R, Fishier 
Decision, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary 
Judgment, no cause of action, be and the same is hereby entered 
in favor of defendant Richard G. Mott and against plaintiff 
Myrna I. Martin. 
DATED this V day of -^ J^ - » l , 19£jf. 
BY THE COURT: 
57 
Philip R. Fishier 
District Judge 
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